Being a religious leader is hard:

Having the authority to tell people (of the same faith traditions) what should be considered right and wrong is always going to rile some up. We feel strongly about our values. Likewise, trying to explore consonances between evolutionary and theological ethics won’t sit well with some religious folk. I hope that if the dissertation is read in its entirety, such individuals might at least understand the intent behind it and appreciate the pains taken to justify its legitimacy on multiple fronts.

To recap, this is the title of my dissertation: “Evolutionary Perspectives on Ethics: A Critical Assessment of their Scientific, Philosophical and Theological Foundations.” And these are the chapters:

1. Introduction & A Selective History of Evolutionary Ethics
2. Engaging with the Fact-Value Gap and Meta-Ethical Objections for Theological Appropriation
3. Assessing the Levels of Certainty Required for Science
4. Tracing and Appraising the Cumulative Case for Evolutionary Ethics
5. Conclusion

The first three parts have been shared in previous posts. Here is part 4.

4. Tracing and Appraising the Cumulative Case for Evolutionary Ethics

This section will begin with assessing optimality models, a feature in the early evolutionary ethical project, sociobiology. They have been critiqued as an inadequate test of adaptive hypotheses, especially in the ‘application of the method to behaviours and life history strategies’ (Smith 2006; Orzack, Forber 2012). [67] Optimality analyses were utilized in engineering and animal ecology with Robert McArthur. They consist of

• 1. A strategy set of bio-physically possible variation concerning animal choice
• 2. An optimization criterion, that is, fitness or some reasonable correlate of fitness
• 3. A fitness function mapping values of the optimization criterion into the members of the strategy set, and
• 4. An analytic method used to determine which members of the strategy set are the optimum (Driscoll 2009: 134; Krebs, Davies 1978: 6-7). [68]

Animal behavioural ecologists were cognizant of the fact that developmental processes and other constraints featured in the ontogeny of animals. However, their utilization of optimality analyses represented a commitment to what they call the “phenotypic gambit”, which assumes that ‘the psychological and inheritance mechanisms responsible for behavioural strategies will be straightforward’ enough to be modelled with some predictive success without recourse to exponentially lengthier developmental and genetic work (Driscoll 2009: 133; Driscoll 2013). While John Krebs and Nicholas Davies argue that optimality models are the best way to understand animal behaviour (Krebs, Davies 1978: 7), philosophers of science argue that many behavioural traits are not heritable, they are instead ‘subject to highly adaptive individual learning or adaptive social transmission processes in populations [which] are nevertheless not adaptations because they are not shaped by natural selection’ (Driscoll 2013). [69]

This problem of potentially falsely identifying a non-adaptive as adaptive trait, among other concerns, led Smith to clarify that ‘the role of optimization theories in biology is not to demonstrate that organisms optimize. Rather, they are an attempt to understand the diversity of life’ (2006: 122). While he concedes that one of the biggest problems for optimality analyses is ‘the difficulty of testing the hypotheses that are generated’ (2006: 100), the ability to modify the models by adding hypotheses to better help understand phenotypic evolution is still aviable enterprise (2006: 123). Similarly, Driscoll notes that for human behaviour, individual learning and cultural evolution create false positives for optimality models, but she expresses support for integration with other methods in the evolutionary social sciences like relevant aspects of cognitive psychology and anthropology, as a solution (Driscoll 2009: 140). It is vital to note that there is no necessary connection between morality and any adaptation. It could have been that ‘morality is a byproduct of other cognitive systems’ (James 2011: 105). The value of “adaptationist” thinking lies in its heuristic value to better understand human nature and behaviour, not the erroneous idea that adaptations directly correlate with actions, behaviours, or traits that humans should consider moral.

Wilson had a moderate view of the explanatory value of optimality models for adaptive hypotheses. Like others, he integrated cultural factors into his work when studying humans, calling this new research programme gene-culture co-evolution. [70] The epigenetic rules within his new system enabled him to trace the evolution of certain ubiquitous human traits related to morality and ethics from the ethnographic and paleoanthropological data such as eusociality, out-group prejudice or tribalism, the arms race in social intelligence with the increase of hominin social groups, and the emergence of mythical stories across cultures which were harnessed for in-group cohesion. This enabled him to continue his project of hypothesizing about the evolution of ethics with a model that attempts to respect the unique eu-cultural status of humans. [71] In this endeavour, he was not alone. Philosophers, researchers, and evolutionarily minded anthropologists have offered narratives that trace the steps of Homo sapiens’ evolution, creating hypotheses about the evolution of human traits related to morality such as incest avoidance, territorial behaviour, the hierarchical nature of large human groups, machiavellian social intelligence, and the expression of the Golden Rule among primitive cultures. [72]

Another research tradition, the Santa Barbara school of evolutionary psychology, forwards adaptive lag as an additional complication to optimality analyses and a modular view of the mind possessing domain-specific psychological mechanisms as a challenge to viewing behaviours themselves as adaptations. They posit universal psychological adaptations that humans share because they helped them solve complex adaptive problems that featured during the Pleistocene, such as ‘foraging, kin recognition, “mind reading”, engaging in social exchange, avoiding incest, choosing mates, interpreting threats, recognizing emotions, caring for children, regulating immune function, and so on’ (Cosmides, Tooby 2006: 181). [73] Two of their founders argue that methodological adaptationism is the best way to model psychological mechanisms because extended work on by-products will lead to a “blind empiricism” that will drown in the ‘deluge of manic and enigmatic measurements’ of mostly irrelevant physical interactions in the brain (Cosmides, Tooby 2006: 191). While this research tradition is currently the most visible among the evolutionary social sciences, it is certainly not without its critics. David Buller has challenged the legitimacy of evolutionary psychology’s key tenets, that is, (1) the modular, or domain-specific view of mind, (2) their function to solve problems of survival and reproduction in the Pleistocene, and (3) their collective constitution of a universal human nature (2006: 199). He argues concerning the first, that a domain general “mechanism” for social learning can just as easily ‘generate domain-specific behavioural solutions to the problems they encounter. The need for highly specific behavioural solutions to adaptive problems in our evolutionary history wouldn’t necessarily have selected for distinct mechanisms’ (2006: 200). Rather, the development of phenotypic plasticity, a domain-general mechanism, able to respond to local environmental demands, can better account for the psychological data (Buller 2006: 201-202).

Concerning the second, Buller argues that ‘Evolutionary Psychologists greatly underestimate the evolutionary change that may have occurred since the end of the Pleistocene’. He writes that

the question is not whether there has been enough time for human populations to evolve minds that are adapted to twenty-first-century environments. The question, instead, is whether there has been enough time for modification of the psychological adaptations possessed by our Pleistocene ancestors (2006: 206, 207)

With that in mind, the data on post-Pleistocene human niche construction and comparative work on the speed of guppy adaptation after being transplanted to a high-predation environment suggest that ‘there is no reason to think that “our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind”’ (Buller 2006: 208). [74] And concerning the third, to take a universal human nature selected for solely by adaptations as axiomatic and permitting no psychological polymorphisms without adequate justification would be to capitulate to a form of natural theology in which God is replaced with natural selection as the creator (2006: 212). Other philosophers have also argued that the existence of species-typical universal complex adaptive features requires more than one data point, that is, the human species, to confirm (Lang et al. 2006: 52-54). Lewens notes that many philosophers have been critical of evolutionary psychology and have tended to favour the more moderate methodological principles of cultural evolutionary theory. However, he notes that their differences may not be as large as some assume. Both are committed to a form of methodological adaptationism. Where they differ most crucially are in the areas of focus, that is, prestige and conformist bias for cultural evolutionary theory and content bias for evolutionary psychology, and the focus on population thinking over individual psychology (Lewens 2015b: 147-153).

Before looking into cultural evolutionary theory, this section will first explore another significant strand of evolutionary theorizing relevant to much of the literature on the evolution of ethics: evolutionary game theory. It is believed that Robert Aumann was among the first to “discover” the folk-theorem, the idea that ‘cooperation can emerge out of nothing more than the rational calculation of self-interest’ with the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Nowak, Highfield 2011: 29). [75] Robert Trivers has also emphasised the importance of the Iterated-PD to explain the evolution of reciprocal altruism in some animals. [76] The fuller implications of the IPD were explored in Hamilton and Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation which showed that the simple tit-for-tat  strategy, a nice and forgiving strategy, devised by Anatol Rapoport, could beat all the other strategies (Nowak, Highfield 2011: 30-32). [77] This received early empirical support from the study of stickleback fish behaviour. [78] However, Joyce rightly notes that the tit-for-tat strategy only wins on a restricted and unrealistic form of IPD that does not take into account noise, that is, chances of miscommunication and mistaken choice, considerations of reputation, emotional factors, non-simultaneity of choice and the option of not playing (Joyce 2006: 28-30). [79] Martin Nowak, one of the leading researchers in the work on evolutionary game theory and the PD, in collaboration with several researchers, devised new models that took just about all these factors into account. He noticed that, in general, an ESS could not coalesce; tit-for-tat co-operators would be overwhelmed by defectors, but when the defectors could no longer benefit from the dwindling supply of suckers, tit-for-tat co-operators would return. Nevertheless, he noted that two strategies stood out as superior to the rest: generous tit-for-tat and win-stay lose-shift, also known as “Pavlov” (Nowak, Highfield 2011: 33-48). [80] This new insight into evolutionary dynamics also found early support, by John Krebs’ estimation, in the strategies of pigeons, rats, mice, and monkeys.

Nowak’s continued work on evolutionary game theory with increasingly complex models enabled him to incorporate other crucial factors, such as spatial factors, indicating that ‘clusters of co-operators can prevail, even if besieged by defectors’, considerations of group selection, which suggest that ‘intense between-group competition will favour mechanisms that blur the distinction between group and individual welfare if they improve performance or fitness at the group level’, networks, which affirm that ‘cooperation can thrive when co-operators huddle together to form [small] clusters’, and set theories which indicate that an intermediate ability for individuals to move among sets would promote the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, Highfield 2011: 80, 93, 250, 262). These considerations have led him to conclude that ‘to favour cooperation, natural selection needs […] mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation’ that include

• 1. Direct reciprocity
• 2. Indirect reciprocity
• 3. Spatial selection or Network reciprocity
• 4. Group or Multi-level selection, and
• 5. Kin selection (2011: 269-272). [81]

The positing of group and multi-level selection marks a controversial return to evolutionary theorizing that characterised Darwin’s work and offers a powerful explanation for animal and human social organization and behaviour. [82]

Nowak notes that these mechanisms cohere with the human evolution of a Theory of Mind, empathy, and social intelligence related to recognizing and building reputation, in one way, through performing indiscriminate cooperative acts. He offers his game theoretical thinking as a means to solve contemporary human problems (2011: 55, 60, 62, 67, 70, 275, 282). Others have also taken this body of game theoretical work to forward the notion that psychologically altruistic dispositions can be said to have evolved from purely naturalistic processes. [83] There are two common objections. If one may recall Jackson’s rejection of this claim about Christian theology, it should also come as no surprise that this claim remains controversial beyond theology. James notes that game theory’s apparent narrow focus on reciprocal relations has difficulty capturing or commenting normatively on a range of complex moral issues such as ‘famine relief, child prostitution, civil rights, disability rights, animal cruelty, pollution and environmental degradation, and genetic enhancement’ (2011: 80). Concerning the second objection, determining the right thing to do in complex situations is not the purpose of evolutionary ethics, even though it may be possible for game theoretical models to approximate these complexities. [84] But, in the vein of the “Chomskyan” linguistic analogy to human moral capacity, such theorizing about the building blocks of morality, if done right, should enable one to affirm the basic constitution of a universal moral capacity that nevertheless expresses itself through diverse moral judgements in different cultural settings and circumstances. [85]

Concerning the first objection, the debate covers a range of topics, but the one most relevant to this dissertation relates to Jackson’s argument, that is, the objection that because game theory is only interested in outcomes, the concept of intentionality, which is foundational for affirming a strong form of altruism, one that meets a non-calculational requirement (Kitcher 2006b: 163), cannot be affirmed. [86] In response, it is helpful to note that James, along with Joyce, have little trouble going on to tracing the evolution of the kind of intentional altruism that goes beyond simple other-regarding behaviours that game theory predicts (James 2011: 48-49, 56, 60-64; Joyce 2006: 107-140). In fact, Joyce argues, concerning his evolutionary theorizing about morality that ‘far from being a just-so story, this evolutionary hypothesis appears to be the best story we have’ (2006: 139). Others have also argued despite protest that cooperation and altruism share a “family resemblance” and that the evolution of morality via game-theoretical analyses, among other methods, can show how psychological altruism has evolved in humans. [87] Some game-theoretical models purport to be able to infer intentionality and motivation by offering mechanisms for cooperation. Recalling the previous section which argues that a radical form of altruism a la Jackson is not strictly relevant to moral theology, Philip Clayton’s discussion of the concept of emergence for affirming the language of altruism without recourse to ‘spooky forces [that] come into existence at the higher levels’ will be instructive. He argues that ‘strong emergence affirms real causal effects at emergent levels of organization in the natural world above the level of microphysics’ (2013: 351). He also points out that a weaker form of emergence, nomological supervenience, allows two levels of complexity in the natural world, for example, brain states (L1) and mental states of an agent (L2) to be linked without ‘believing that L2 phenomena can be predicted on the basis of L1 phenomena alone’ (2013: 352). While he defends strong emergence over nomological supervenience as ‘an indispensable condition for the success of theological explanations that take the best findings from the sciences and religion seriously’ (2013: 344), if, at the very least, the capacity for psychological altruism can be inferred from game theoretical data alone, then, quite outside robust theological concerns, nomological supervenience can offer sufficient explanation for the evolution of altruistic motivations and intentions.

One significant recent enquiry that would bolster the evolution of psychological altruism is Frans De Waal’s primate-human comparative study, which evades the issues surrounding evolutionary psychology’s single datapoint and purports to show, via the appeal to Homo Sapiens’ shared ancestry with the primates in his extensive study that humans should not be understood as

garden trolls covered by a thin veneer of gaudy paint, but as “Russian dolls”—our external moral selves are ontologically continuous with a nested series of inner “prehuman selves.” And all the way down to the tiny little figure in the very center, these selves are homogenously “goodnatured” (Ober, Macedo 2006:xiv). [89]

Examples of this “good-naturedness” include empathy, reciprocity, and groupish-ness, which, driven by the enlargement of the human brain, have led to ‘explicit teachings about the value of the community and the precedence it takes, or ought to take, over individual interest’ (De Waal 2006: 20-21, 48, 54). For De Waal, this means that any scientifically informed ethical theory must take into account homologous studies of primate sociality – in consistency with the kind of virtue ethics proposed by Casebeer and Kitcher in the previous section – and not only on, broadly speaking, Kantian deontological and utilitarian considerations, in opposition to Peter Singer and Christine Korsgaard’s objections to De Waal’s work in their collaborative book Primates and Philosophers. [90] Recalling the previous section, James notes that this continuity explains the innate moral sense that infants and very young children display and develop without explicit moral teaching, indicating that moral nativism may be true (2011: 88, 90, 96, 100, 102, 105, 110). [91] However, this project is controversial.

Aldo Fasolo argues that the above project cannot get off the ground unless ‘we manage to individuate strict homological correspondences among all the feasible generic analogies between human behaviour and animal behaviour’ (2006: 56). To that end, a lot of careful work is required and it is not certain that De Waal’s comparative approach can or will ever meet these requirements. Kitcher has also argued that

until we have a clearer view of the specific kinds of psychological altruism chimpanzees […] display, and until we know what kinds are relevant to morality, it’s premature to claim that human morality is a “direct outgrowth” of tendencies these animals share (2006c: 129-130).

He does concede that some primate behaviour does exhibit convincing examples of psychological altruism, but, in the vein of Korsgaard and Singer, questions their relevance to the exponentially more complex nexus of ‘human moral practice’ (Kitcher 2006c: 131), especially in the realm of conflict resolution, where it seems that something like Kant’s “inner reasoner” is also required for judgement and adjudication. In this sense, De Waal’s dichotomizing of veneer theory with the Russian doll model is an oversimplification, since the truth is inevitably going to lie somewhere between those two extremes. Consequently, he contends that a study of the cultural evolution of moral judgments and ethical codes, for example, Mesopotamian law codes, are required to better understand ‘how we got from here to there, one which sees the development of a capacity for normative guidance—perhaps understood in that enlargement and refinement of sympathy that gives rise to [Adam] Smith’s impartial spectator—as a crucial step’ (2006c: 124, 136-138). And concerning the moral innateness of children, other philosophers have argued that this does not necessarily entail moral nativism, but that ‘specific biases, or […] “affective resonances” are innate. The connections between biases and morality are forged by one’s environment – in particular, the transmission of emotionally powerful ideas’ (James 2011: 110). [92] They emphasise human learning as the most important factor in the development of human morality, such that, ‘on these proposals, natural selection’s role is demoted to that of provider of raw materials’ out of which diverse moral systems are constructed through cultural evolution (James 2011: 82). [93]

Cultural evolutionary theory which converged to model cultural processes on loose evolutionary principles evades some of the potential problems listed above. The early architects who were labelled gene-culture co-evolutionists, like Wilson, attempted to show how genes and culture co-evolved in Homo sapiens’ evolutionary history, but unlike Wilson, lent more leeway to cultural processes. [94] Lewens, who was the principal investigator of a recent European Research Council funded project “A Science of Human Nature”, embarked on the hitherto unprecedented task of aggregating and assessing the contemporary debates concerning ‘evolutionary approaches to cultural change’ and whether or not “Darwinian thinking” could unify the natural and social sciences. In so doing, he argues that the kinetic as opposed to selectionist approach, which emphasises evolutionary tools such as population thinking over selection, can ‘make valuable contributions as elements of a broad synthetic project in the social sciences’ (2015b: ix, 3, 6). For example, it removes the problematic claim that “adaptationist” thinking will eclipse other social scientific methods since under the kinetic approach, ‘the cultural evolutionist’s adaptive thinking should be highly deferential to work in developmental psychology, neuroscience, ethnography, and so forth’. In other words, ‘if cultural evolutionary work is to make progress, its practitioners will need to steep themselves in these more traditional approaches’ (2015b: 161, 5, 42, 167, 183). [95] He goes on to argue against common objections that the informational notion of culture and a libertine concept of human nature are not problematic, and furthermore, that embodied emotional states, vital to work on the evolution of morality, can be placed under the purview of cultural evolutionary thinking (2015b: 169). Consequently, by an extension of his view, cultural evolution related to morality and ethics can be modelled to a limited extent, with careful, cumulative, and collaborative work.

Taken together, what these prominent trends in evolutionary ethics suggest is that worries over the utilization of crude and inaccurate “adaptationist” thinking are largely unfounded. The population thinking characteristic of some aspects of sociobiology and cultural evolutionary theory should take precedence over any data-distorting effects of strong adaptationism. Furthermore, a methodological adaptationism that characterises work in evolutionary psychology, primate-human comparative studies, and evolutionary game theory ensure that as a heuristic tool, it need not fall prey to Gould and Lewontin’s objections if work done carefully and cross-checked with other disciplines. Laland and Brown also note that little is incompatible between the various evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour. [96] They argue that the distinctions ‘are more a question of focus than any fundamental  differences of opinion’. Echoing Lewens’ optimism for a constructive synthesis, they write that these perspectives differ in their ‘different views as to how humans learn from each other’, but that ‘all these perspectives could be correct to some degree. […] The question then turns to how frequently each finds empirical support’ (Laland, Brown 2002: 303, 314, 314). As this section has shown, many of these methods are limited and contingent on their own, but since they are often able to build on each other, shoring up each other’s weaknesses and correcting each other’s excesses, they can offer a sense of validity that is stronger than their parts. They converge on the idea that the building blocks of morality: empathy, cooperation, psychological altruism, and groupish-ness, as well as the mechanisms for cooperation, such as indirect reciprocity and multi-level selection, are readily extrapolated from nature, which, echoing Margulis’ ideas, debunks the popular but erroneous notion that natural selection can only create selfish creatures. By contrast, they indicate that nature’s overall telos tends toward symbiosis.

In fact, Nowak goes as far as to assert that cooperation should be seen as the third fundamental force in evolution, in addition to mutation and selection (2011: 3). He argues, given the increasing interconnectedness of society and the vulnerabilities and opportunities that come with this interconnectedness, that

we need to place more faith in citizens than leaders. Cooperation has to come from the bottom up and not be imposed from the top down. That is why, for example, democracy is a cornerstone concept, since this is a form of cooperation that grows from the roots (2011: 282).

In a similar vein, much of the work in evolutionary ethics can offer pointers of application for legitimate theological appropriation, given the “Aristotelian” virtue ethical model defended in the second section. While this dissertation set out as an objection clearing exercise in order to defend its primary thesis that evolutionary ethics and theology can and should enter into constructive dialogue, a few preliminary examples can be suggested. The awareness of humanity’s biological constraints, for example, their almost universal inclination toward groupish-ness, along with the concomitant natural tendency toward “ideological territoriality”, [97] should lead to extra self-awareness and caution when claiming divinely sanctioned moral or ethical pronouncements concerning forms of religious expression and practice within and outside a group’s favoured form of faith, and consequently, a greater tolerance for the natural cycle of religious expression and belief concerning moral matters that no guild can hold a sustained monopoly over. [98] This keen awareness of the building blocks of human morality will also provide tools for understanding what may be necessary to nurture and expand their “circle of morality” toward greater and greater facets of creation to which humanity has been called to steward, in part, through the development of character. [99] This can very likely be accomplished with a combination of the enlargement of emotions like empathy, the appeal to an “impartial spectator”, and the assurance of personal security, all of which can be conveniently bolstered by the theistic supposition. [100] In one non-theological example, Nowak suggests that the appeal of indirect reciprocity can be harnessed to ‘realign the internal compass of millions of individual minds’ toward conservation efforts through an increased public display of commitment among those so disposed (2011: 218-219). It is no stretch of the imagination to see how this can supplement principles already utilized in church organisation and practice. [101]

This approach also offers the possibility of providing further justification for an appraisal of the scriptural witness on loose evolutionary principles, mentioned in a footnote at the end of section three, which may aid in the move away from a voluntarism that demands arbitrary actions and prohibitions based on proof texts towards one that focuses on character traits, the intention behind actions, and the cultivation of virtue within the context of the freely given grace that much of theology affirms. [102] Perhaps most importantly, being made keenly aware of universal human psychological foibles, like the self-serving bias from an evolutionary epistemological account through a thorough education in the relevant disciplines, will provide theologians, church leaders, and laypeople with a self-awareness that could serve as a bulwark against dualist, or “gnostic” thinking characteristic of the Intellectual Arrogance of some forms of contemporary fundamentalisms. These fundamentalisms are the ones that tend to fear uncertainty, deal only in absolutes and ignore eschatology’s – and by extension humanity’s – embodied nature, which has created and continues to create much unnecessary suffering. [103]

Endnotes

• 67 See (Lewontin 1979), (Orzack, Forber 2012)
• 68 See also (Kitcher 1985: 228-229), (Wilson 1978)
• 69 See (Henrich, Boyd 1998)
• 70 See (Wilson 1981)
• 71 See (Wilson 1998a), (Wilson 2012), (Wilson 2014)
• 72 See for example (Parmigiani, et. at 2006: 132), (Binmore 2005: 111-112, 130-138), (Dunbar 2014), (Margulis 1995: 165), (James 2011), (Joyce 2006) and (Nowak, Highfield 2011: 56)
• 73 See (Barkow et al. 1992)
• 74 See (Reznick et, al 1997)
• 75 See (Binmore 2005: 77)
• 76 See (Trivers 1971)
• 77 See (Axelrod, Hamilton 1981) and (Axelrod 1984)
• 78 See (Milinski 1987), see also (Dawkins 1976: 203-208)
• 79 See also (Alexander 2008: 420)
• 80 See also (Joyce 2006: 30)
• 81 See also (Nowak 2013: 100-105, 110)
• 82 See (Lewens 2015a: 184-188), (Grene, Depew 2004: 273-274), (Wilson 2014: 23-24, 72-75), (Allen et al. 2013), (Nowak, Highfield 2011: 84-93, 104-112), (Okasha 2013), (Wilson, Wilson 2007), (Wilson, Wilson 2008); for a more nuanced discussion, see also (Boyer 2001: 287-288), (Atran 2002: 216, 272), (De Waal 2009: 16), (Richerson, Boyd 1998)
• 83 See for example (Johnson 2013: 169)
• 84 See (Fisher 2013)
• 85 See (Hauser 2013: 255-257, 262). His contribution is not related to and remains relevant despite his scientific misconduct. See also (Joyce 2006: 65), (James 2011: 107-108), (Boniolo 2006), (Lohmann 2013)
• 86 See for example (Lohmann 2013: 277)
• 87 See (Sober 1994b), (Kosslyn 2013), (Hauser 2013), (Lewens 2015a: 174-179) and (Kitcher 2006b)
• 88 See also (Messer 2007: 17)
• 89 For discussion on his work’s relevance to game theory, see (De Waal 2006: 13), see also (James 2011: 30, 41)
• 90 See (Singer 2006: 148-151), (Korsgaard 2006: 112, 116-117) and (Binmore 2005: 11)
• 91 See (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989: 789), (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1991), (Warneken and Tomaselo 2007), (Warneken and Tomaselo 2009: 397), (Pinker 1994)
• 92 See (Nichols 2004) and (Sripada 2008)
• 93 See (Levy 2004: 205), (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1995: 167)
• 94 See (Henrich et al. 2008: 134)
• 95 See also (Lewens 2013)
• 96 They have in mind sociobiology, human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology, meme theory and geneculture co-evolution.
• 97 See (Wilson 2012: 59, 75-76, 91, 258-260), (Wilson 2014: 31), (Gregg 2014: 10)
• 98 See (Dunbar 2014: 277, 279, 280, 313, 328-329), (Atran 2002: 16, 269) and (Boyer 2001: 282-285, 316-317, 321), this approximates the theology of Rowan Williams, see (Williams 2000)
• 99 See for example (Long 2010: 111), (Wilson 2014: 127-132)
• 100 See (De Waal 2006: 18, 164), (Singer 2006: 145, 148, 150-151) and (Kitcher 2006b)
• 101 See for example Joseph Grenny’s talk on “Mastering the Skill of Influence” at the Willow Creek Global Leadership Conference in 2013.
• 102 See for example the recent converging emphasis on a relational understanding of sin as wrong being rather than wrong doing in (Jenson 2006) and (McFadyen 2000)
• 103 See (Samuelson, Church, Jarvinen, Paulus 2013), (Kahneman 2011), (Haught 2008: 115-116)